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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
decision in the McFall case and sustained the third party complain in
Merriweatheron the sole basis of the allegation of an express contract between
the shipowner and the employer.
The decision in this case points up the necessity for parties dealing with
employers covered by the Longshoremen's Act to be certain that their transactions are evidenced by a valid and enforcable contract. For the benefit of such
employers and parties dealing with them, it is desirable that such a contract
contain express terms covering the employer's duty to indemnify against
damages paid to an injured employee.
STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEM:

FINALITY OF COMPTROLLER'S DETERMiNATION

OF NATURE OF ACCIDENT

Section 61 of the Retirement and Social Security Law provides that an
"accidental death benefit" shall be payable upon the death of a member of
the New York State retirement fund if the Comptroller shall determine that
he died before the effective date of his retirement "as the natural and proximate result of an accident sustained in the performance of duty." In Croshier
v. Levitt,50 the decedent, 57 years of age, had been a forest ranger for the
State Conservation Department. His death was caused by a heart attack
while fighting a forest fire. He had a history of heart trouble for which on
one previous occasion he had been hospitalized.
The decedent's widow, claiming that his death was the result of an accident, applied for the benefits allowed under Section 61. The Comptroller
rejected the claim on the ground that decedent's death was not due to an
accident. The Appellate Division annulled the Comptroller's determination, 51
and this appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals reversed in a 4-3 opinion,
holding,
the mere fact that the medical and physiological facts are not seriously in dispute does not convert the ultimate issue of whether the
a
death was "the natural and proximate result of an accident" 5into
2
pure question of law on which this Court has the final word.
Section 74 of the above Act gives the Comptroller "exclusive authority"
in determining all applications for such a benefit. 53 The problem is, what did
the Legislature mean by "exclusive authority"? Does this allow the Comptroller to establish a definition of accident for purposes of this Act or is he
bound by the standards used in similar fields such as Workmen's Compensation? It is significant to note, as did the majority in this case, that in Nash
v. Brooks,54 it was held that an Industrial Board determination of accidental
injury in a Workmen's Compensation proceeding was to be binding upon the
medical board of the Retirement System. The Legislature changed this result
50.

5 N.Y.2d 259, 184 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1959).

51.
52.
53.

Croshier v. Levitt, 5 A.D.2d 941, 172 N.Y.S.2d 344 (3d Dep't 1959).
Croshier v. Levitt, supra note 50.
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54. 276 N.Y. 75, 11 N.E.2d 545 (1937).
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by amending the law to provide that the Comptroller is to have "exclusive
authority" and that no decision by the Workmen's Compensation Board shall
be binding on him. 55 A number of decisions subsequent to this change are helpfu in determining what the Legislature intended to accomplish. In MeCadden
v. Moore,56 a police officer was permanently injured due to a coronary attack
suffered while shovelling snow in the performance of his duty. The Comptroller denied his application for accidental disability benefits. The Appellate
Division confirmed the determination and in its opinion stated, "the duty of
determining the question of fact as to whether or not an employee has sustained accidental injury is for the Comptroller." Similarly, in Odell v. McGovern57 and Morrisey v. McGovern,58 where the Comptroller had held there
had been no accident, recovery was denied. In the latter case, the Appellate Division said,
It is now settled that the Comptroller has the power to determine
that strain or over-exertion resulting in a heart attack does not constitute an accident for purposes of administering the retirement system, notwithstanding the fact that it may constitute an accident for
Workmen's Compensation purposes.59
Implicit in these decisions is a recognition of the fact that in determining
whether a particular injury was the result of an accident for purposes of Section 61, the Comptroller can apply a more strict test than can a Workmen's
Compensation Board.
The Appellate Division, in the instant case, annulled the Comptroller's
determination, purporting to follow Owens v. McGovern.0° There, a surveyor,
while working on rough terrain in adverse weather conditions, suffered a fatal
heart attack. The Comptroller found the death not to be the result of an
accident. He had refused, however, to admit medical testimony on the point.
The Court of Appeals, Desmond, J., remanded the case saying, "a claim of
an 'accident' consisting of a heart injury cannot be sustained without medical
testimony."161 In a concurring opinion, Judge Fuld agreed with the disposition
of the appeal on this point, but also added that this did not mean that the
Comptroller must find the existence of an accident. He pointed out that it is
only necessary that the evidence be admitted and then if different inferences
may reasonably be drawn, the Comptroller is free to make a determination.
"If his findings and conclusions find support in the record, the courts have
no alternative but to accept them." 62 Clearly, then, accepting either opinion
of the Owens case does not require any departure from the views expressed in
the cases previously discussed.
55. Supra note 53.
56.

301 N.Y. 760, 95 N.E.2d 819 (1950).

57. 308 N.Y. 678, 124 NXE.2d 319 (1954).
58. 1 A).2d 746, 146 N.Y.S.2d 865 (3d Dep't 1955).
59.

Id. at 747, 146 N.Y.S.2d 866.

60. 309 N.Y. 449, 131 N.E.2d 729 (1956).

61. Ibid.
62.

Supra note 60.
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The dissenting opinions all take the position that a question of accident
vel non is one of law. Accordingly, they argue, since the evidence does not
support the Comptroller's conclusion, it is erroneous and the Court may overturn it. The main difficulty with this position is that it finds no support in
the prior decisions of the Court. An issue raised in Judge Dye's dissent is
that even though the Comptroller is not bound to accept a Workmen's Compensation determination, he is still bound to use the same definition of "accident." If this were so, then a determination by the Comptroller would
necessarily have to be consistent with a finding of the Workmen's Compensation Board. The legislature, however, has expressly provided that the findings
need not be consistent. The only logical explanation is that the legislature
intended that different criteria would be used in each instance.
At first glance, the result seems harsh since it makes it almost impossible
to receive accidental death benefits in cases where a heart attack is caused by
over-exertion. However, it should be noted that this does not deny compensation altogether as it would in Workmen's Compensation cases. Here, the fact
of an accident only pertains to the amount which will be paid. The beneficiary
will still receive some benefits even though the death was not caused by an
accident.

MISCELLANEOUS
ARBITRATION-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF EmPLOY ENT CONTRACT

The petitioner entered into an eleven year employment contract with the
defendant corporation. Included in the contract was an agreement that if the
petitioner should be declared permanently disabled he would receive a reduced
compensation for the next three years and the contract would be terminated.
The contract also provided that any controversy arising should be settled by
arbitration in accordance with the American Arbitration Association rules.
The directors of the corporation made a determination that the petitioner was
permanently disabled and that his services should be terminated. The petitioner
disputed the finding of permanent disability and the resulting difference of
opinion was submitted to arbitration. The arbitrators held in favor of petitioner on the issue and ordered petitioner's reinstatement.
The Supreme Court at Special Term granted the petitioner's motion to
confirm the arbitrator's award and denied a cross motion to vacate it. This
ruling was affirmed by the Appellate Division and was upheld by the Court
of Appeals, 4-2, in Staklinski v. Pyramid Electric Company.1
The basic issue involved in this case is whether a court may, on an application to confirm an arbitration award, enter a decree of specific performance
1.

Staklinski v. Pyramid Electric Co., 10 Misc. 2d 706, 172 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sup.

Ct. 1958), aff'd 6 A.D.2d 565, 180 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1st Dep't 1958), aff'd 6 N.Y.2d 159, 188
N.Y.S.2d 541 (1959).

